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Abstract
Current tax law makes it difficult to enforce sales taxes on most Internet
commerce and has generated considerable policy debate.  In this paper we analyze the
costs and benefits of enforcing such taxes including revenue losses, competition with
retail, externalities, distribution, and compliance costs.  The results suggest that the costs
of not enforcing taxes are quite modest and will remain so for several years.  At the same
time, compliance costs are likely to be low and the benefits of nurturing the Internet
diminishing over time.  When tax costs and benefits take this form, a moratorium provides
a natural compromise.I. Introduction
Existing sales tax law treats goods sold over the Internet the same way it treats
goods sold from catalog companies.  This means, roughly, that any company without a
physical presence in a state (known as nexus) cannot be required to collect that state’s
sales tax even if the customer lives in the state.  If a buyer in Boston, for example, orders a
book from amazon.com (located in Washington state), although the buyer technically
owes a use tax (equivalent to the sales tax) on the purchase to Massachusetts, the state
cannot require amazon.com to collect the tax because amazon has no nexus in
Massachusetts.  Instead, states must rely on self-reporting and payment by the customers,
making enforcement almost non-existent except in special cases such as for goods like
automobiles that must be registered.  In this sense, the Internet is a virtually tax-free sales
channel.
While most of the tax issues raised by the Internet are the same as those raised in
the earlier battles over the taxation of mail-order sales (see ACIR, 1986), the rapid growth
of online commerce has ignited a major debate as to how Internet commerce should be
treated.  State Tax Notes has declared the issue of taxes and electronic commerce to be
“the hottest topic in multistate taxation.” (Sheppard, 1998).  On one side, state
governments and the National Governors Association have noted the potential revenue
losses from online transactions and called for immediate enforcement of sales taxes.  On
the other, Internet advocates have argued that cyberspace is still fragile and its future
uncertain; to tax it now, they say, might seriously damage its growth (see Wyden, 1997;
Andal, 1997; Stephenson and Zeisser, 1998).In 1998, Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) placing a three-
year moratorium on new taxes on the Internet.  The ITFA, however, does not restrict right
of States to apply sales and use taxes to online commerce (these are not, after all, new
taxes).  Instead it primarily prevents states from applying new taxes to Internet access.  Its
primary effect regarding sales taxes is to prevent states from either applying sales taxes to
categories of electronic services or goods with no physical counterpart or applying
discriminatory sales taxes on Internet commerce that do not, for example, apply to catalog
sales.
Though the ITFA itself did not change the sales tax status quo, it did call for
Congress to appoint an advisory commission to come up with recommendations about
how the tax system should treat online commerce.  The panel’s work is taken seriously
enough that the National Association of Counties and U.S. Conference of Mayors, fearing
that the panel was stacked against local governments, filed suit to prevent the advisory
commission created by the ITFA from meeting to draft recommendations.
On the basic issue of weighing the costs and benefits of enforcing taxes on the
Internet, most of the discussion has taken place in the political arena rather in academic
research (see Graham, 1999; Smith, 1999).  Most of the existing academic literature on
the subject of Internet taxes has been conceptual discussions and legal analyses.
1  Because
the area is so new there has been very little empirical work.
2   Most of the explicit
discussions weighing the costs and benefits of tax policy toward Internet commerce has
taken place in the popular press and has been more political .
In this paper we use the best available data in an attempt to evaluate some of the
costs and benefits claimed in the debate about Internet commerce.  The lack of systematicdata sources means that on many important points, the evidence is  more qualitative and
suggestive rather than definitive.  In our discussion, we emphasize the importance of
distinguishing between the short and the long run when thinking about Internet commerce.
The timing of Internet tax policy is crucial.  For example, most of the major benefits from
taxing the Internet such as preventing revenue losses or eliminating competition with retail
stores and are unlikely to become important for several years while the importance of the
costs of taxing Internet commerce including enforcement costs and lost externalities are
likely to fall over time.  A cost/benefit structure such as this naturally lends itself to a
moratorium as a compromise position.
The paper proceeds by evaluating the main costs and benefits of taxing Internet
commerce in six sections.  These include: revenue loss from Internet commerce,
competition with retail trade, distribution, enforcement costs, and externalities.  The final
section concludes with discussion of the potential for compromise and the future of tax
policy.
Revenue Loss from Internet Commerce
The most important presumed cost of not enforcing taxes on Internet commerce is
the potential revenue loss.  Sales taxes are, obviously, quite important to state and local
government finance.  As table 1 shows, in FY 1995-96, general sales taxes raised almost
$170 billion.  This was second only to property taxes as an overall source of tax revenue
and was the largest source of revenue for state governments.  Give this importance, it is
understandable why policy makers are concerned about the issue and decry the potential
narrowing of the sales tax base.  As the Center for Community Economic Research atBerkeley rather colorfully put it, “state and local government finances are becoming road
kill on the information superhighway.” (Newman, 1995).  The National Governors
Association has quoted forecasts that by 2002 there may be more than $300 billion of
commerce over the web or through mail-order and concluded that this will cost up to $20
billion in lost tax revenue (Boston Globe, 1998).  Similar numbers are often cited by
advocates of enforcing Internet taxation (see, for example, Graham, 1999).
As best we can tell, the standard calculation in these revenue loss estimates is made
by multiplying total sales by the average tax rate and calling that the loss in revenue.  For
several reasons, however, this is highly inaccurate.  First, the predicted amounts of
commerce seem to include business-to-business sales as well as business-to-consumer.
The business-to-business is largely exempt from sales tax.  Forrester Research, the leading
market research company regarding the information economy, has estimated that business-
to-business sales will be (and are) much larger than the business-to-consumer (see
McQuivey et al., 1998 and Erwin, et al., 1997).  Second, the predicted revenue losses
ignore the possibility of trade creation.  Products that might not have been purchased in a
store were it not for the Internet, such as online greeting cards, should not be counted for
lost revenue.  Third, even if we assume that electronic commerce is entirely diversionary
and that all of the commerce will be business-to-consumer, the calculations still have
serious flaws by failing to account for the types of products being sold.
Table 2A, for example, presents data from the Boston Consulting Group report on
Internet business-to-consumer sales by type of product in the first quarter of 1998 (Boston
Consulting Group, 1998).  Notice that several of the categories, including financial
services, travel, automotive, and, in some states, food and apparel, do not result in lostsales tax revenue for the states either because no sales tax applies (travel, financial) or
because, although taxable, seller’s nexus is likely even if the Internet is used to make
purchases (automobiles, groceries).  Together, obviously non-taxed categories account for
more than 40% of total online sales in this period (about $2.3 billion).
3
Of the remaining 60% of sales that may qualify as revenue losers, computer goods
alone account for almost half.  When calculating the incremental revenue loss from the
growth of the Internet, however, computer goods raise several important issues.  First,
many computer sellers online already pay sales taxes.  Having in-state repair services, for
example, can create nexus for the seller (see Multistate Tax Commission, 1995) and one
of the largest online sellers, Gateway, does charge sales tax.
Second, for those without nexus, it is important to note that not every computer
bought over the Internet would have been purchased in a store if the Internet did not exist.
Computer goods have had a brisk mail-order business for many years (well before the
Internet began).  Forrester Research’s Technographics data (described in more detail in
the appendix) suggests that about 20% of computer owners purchased their latest
machines directly from the manufacturer (while a bit less than 2% bought them over the
Internet).  It is doubtful that a customer who today buys from Dell Online, for example,
would buy a computer in a store if there were no Internet when she could instead buy
from Dell directly by telephone.  If Internet sales cannibalize non-taxed catalog sales rather
than retail store stales, the growth of Internet commerce does not imply any additional
revenue losses to state governments.
Although it is hard to find data to make an industry-wide argument, Dell is an
important example.  Our estimates indicate that, in the first six months of 1998, Dell mayhave sold around $435 million online to consumers (more than one quarter of the
computer goods in the BCG sample).
4  Few of those sales were taken away from stores.
If not for the Internet, they would have likely gone to Dell’s mail-order business.
Taken together, we believe that much of the computer goods category should not
be considered a revenue loser.  For simplicity, then, let us assume that one half of
computer goods sales did not pay the sales tax but would have if the law were changed.
The true number is probably much lower.  This assumption would imply that another 30%
of online retail sales did not cut into local revenues.
After eliminating all of the non-applicable sales, there were about $2.5 billion of
sales that may qualify as revenue losses to state governments if we make the somewhat
implausible assumption that all auction transactions would have paid sales tax if they had
taken place through newspaper classified ads, and so on.  The weighted average sales tax
rate in the U.S. is about 6.33% (see Goolsbee, 1998) so the actual revenue loss in the first
six months of 1998 was on the order of $157 million.  Even with a 213% annual growth
rate, the total revenue loss for the 1998 entire year was a bit more that $430 million.  The
same analysis using more detailed data from Forrester Research listed in table 2B puts the
total revenue loss for 1998 at around $210 million (McQuivey, et al., 1998).
5  With overall
sales tax revenue growing at 6% nominal rates (as indicated in Bureau of the Census,
1997; 1998), the revenue loss in 1998 using either measure amounted to less than one-
quarter of one percent of total state and local sales tax revenue (or 0.05 percent of total
tax revenue).
Looking to the future, Forrester estimates that from now to 2003, online retail
spending will grow almost 70 percent per year when it will total more than $108 billion.Their prediction includes estimates by category.  Doing the same calculation on the five-
years-out projection, yields a revenue loss of $3.5 billion-still less than 2 percent of sales
tax revenue even after a half-decade of rapid growth.
6 Doing so suggests that the total
revenue loss would be (again assuming only diversionary sales) about $470 million in
1999, $880 million in 2000, $1.4 billion in 2001, $2.3 billion in 2002, and $3.5 billion in
2003.  With average growth rates of general sales taxes, the Internet revenue losses will,
even after several years of dramatic growth, amount to less than two percent of sales tax
revenue.
To put these revenue numbers in perspective, note that the Census Bureau’s
Monthly Retail Sales suggests that mail-order sales topped $55 billion in 1998 and this is
likely to be significantly understated as explained in ACIR (1986).  The existence of
untaxed catalog sales has not bankrupted state budgets and for the next several years,
online sales are likely to be considerably smaller than mail-order sales was even decades
ago.
Alternatively, consider the numerical question of how much the sales tax on retail
goods would have to rise in order to cover the revenue short-falls generated by the
Internet sales.
7  Based on the Forrester forecasts, to keep revenue constant, the average
tax rate on sales would need to rise from 6.33% to 6.35% in 1998.  Five years later, in
2003, to keep revenue constant would require an increase from 6.33 percent to about 6.40
percent.  These small changes may imply that the costs of enforcement might not be better
applied elsewhere in the short run.  For example, the estimates in Slemrod (1999)
concerning the revenue generated in Michigan from a simple crackdown in cigarettesmuggling imply that this had a substantially greater impact on Michigan state tax revenue
than would aggressive enforcement of Internet taxation.
In some sense, the modest costs of not enforcing taxation on Internet sales
numbers illustrate why the advocates immediate enforcement consistently invoke revenue
loss projections from well into the future.  Only after an extended period of rapid growth
will the issue become substantively important.  If the growth rate of online retail
commerce continues at 70 percent per year after 2003, by 2007, the revenue loss would
amount to as much as 10 percent of total sales tax revenue.  If Forrester were significantly
too conservative and online retail commerce doubled every year, the revenue losses would
amount to 10 percent of sales tax revenue as early as 2004.  It is the possibility of these
extreme losses, albeit well into the future, that makes the issue of enforcement so
politically sensitive today.  The states want to ensure that online sales will be taxed before
they become important rather than after.  When Internet sales account for, say 10 or 20%
of total retail sales, they believe it may be difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.  The
data suggest, however, that for the next several years, at least, there is little revenue to be
gained from enforcing taxes on Internet sales.
Internet Competition With Retail Stores
Another basic benefit claimed by advocates of enforcing taxes on Internet
commerce is to eliminate the unfair disadvantage that uneven tax enforcement puts retail
stores at relative to their online (and out-of-state) counterparts.  Presumably, there is some
notion about tax-induced distortions.  If consumers, for example, would prefer to buy
from a local store but buy online only to avoid taxes, the tax is creating an inefficiency.
8Evaluating the competition with retail is really asking whether Internet purchases
are being diverted from retail purchases or are wholly new transactions.  This is very much
like the trade creation versus trade diversion arguments about bilateralism found in the
international trade literature (see Viner, 1950).  Thus far, Internet sales are so small that
no one has addressed the question.
To properly answer it would require panel data on the retail and online buying
habits of individuals over time.  No such data exist.  Instead, we use cross-sectional data
from Forrester conducted at the end of 1997, compiled in Technographics ’98 and
described in the data appendix.  This random survey of 110,000 people yielded
approximately 25,000 users of the Internet.  Each of these individuals was also asked to
give a qualitative ranking of how frequently they shop in certain types of retail stores
(OFTEN, SOMETIMES, RARELY, NEVER).  We aggregate their answers for discount
retailers, wholesale clubs, upscale department stores, moderate department stores, and
other department stores in two ways.  First, we choose the maximum level of shopping in
the five categories as the measure of retail shopping (i.e., if they report rarely shopping at
an upscale department store and often shopping at a wholesale club, they would count as
shopping often).  Second, we rank each of the categories numerically (0 for never, 1 for
rarely, and so on) and sum them across the five store types to get a measure of total retail
shopping.
To test for the competition between Internet and retail commerce, we estimate
equations for the amount of retail shopping done by an individual controlling for that
person’s education, income, age, race, gender, marital status, presence of children under
18, use of a computer at work, running of a business from home, and ownership of acomputer in the year before the survey.  In addition to these controls, we also include
whether the person has bought online.  If online buying comes at the expense of retail
buying, we would expect a significant negative coefficient.  We do not list the coefficients
on the controls for reasons of space but they were generally not surprising.
Because this is not panel data, of course, this regression may suffer from bias due
to unobservable, individual-specific traits.  This bias could go either way.  There could be
an upward bias if the people who, beyond their observables, shop online are people with
higher consumption levels who shop more in every venue.  There could be downward if
the people buying online are people who, for example, have little access to retail stores.  In
either case, the estimated substitution pattern between retail and the Internet will not
reflect the true pattern but instead will reflect the distribution of unobservable traits across
people.  Despite this potential limitations, these are the only data that exist.
Column 1 of table 1 shows the results from an ordered logit estimation where the
dependent variable is the maximum amount of shopping (four categories) across the five
store types.  The results indicate that people who have bought online are more likely to
frequently shop at some type of retail store, controlling for individual characteristics.  The
same is true in column 2 where we conduct an ordered logit of the aggregated measure of
shopping (24 categories).  There is, again, a small but significantly positive coefficient on
buying online for the amount of retail shopping.  Finally in column 3 we do a linear
regression of the aggregated measure but include state-metropolitan area dummies to
account for correlated unobservables, differences in sales tax rates, and so on.  The results
do not change much.Evidence like this is only suggestive, but it does not seem to point to intense
competition between retail and online commerce at present-consistent with the notion of
Internet as trade creator.  As time progresses, however, and the Internet becomes a larger
fraction of total retail, the competition may become more intense.
Distributional Considerations
Not enforcing taxes on the Internet, as argued in the popular press, does have
particular distributional effects (see for example, Gillmor, 1999).  The incidence is not
random.  The argument is that online purchasers are disproportionately wealthy so failing
to collect tax on Internet commerce then represents an indirect transfer to the rich.  If
online purchases are not taxed, anyone with enough money to buy a computer can avoid
sales tax, while less well-off individuals cannot.
A general lack of data has prevented much analysis of the issue but it seems
intuitive that online individuals would be better off than those not online.  The Forrester
data (listed in Table 4) confirm the significant difference in terms of income and education
between wired and non-wired customers.  The average Internet user has almost two more
years of education and $22,000 more family income than the average nonuser.
The regressiveness, however,  is becoming noticeably less pronounced over time.
Dividing the Internet users up by the year they first started going online, we see that newer
users have significantly lower levels of education and income than existing users.  Since
the number of Internet adopters is accelerating dramatically over time, the data suggest
that the distributional issues seem to be lessening over time.Furthermore, the data are not consistent with the broader claim that online buying
is primarily serving as a way for the rich to avoid paying sales taxes.  As the bottom panel
of table 3 shows, while richer people are more likely to have online access than poorer
people, even among those in the highest third of income (more than $50,000 per year),
most do not have Internet access.  The second column shows, as well, that of those with
access, only about one in five has actually bought something online and these rates do not
vary much by income level.  In addition, the calculations in Goolsbee (1998) and Krantz
(1998) suggest that even for those with access who choose to buy, the amount they spend
is fairly modest.
Enforcement Costs
One frequently mentioned potential cost to taxing Internet commerce is the
difficulty of enforcing such taxes (see the Economist, 1997).  Basic theory suggests that
tax rates should be low on activities where enforcement is difficult or costly.  The
potential enforcement problems of Internet taxes are numerous.  First, in a reprise of the
original argument establishing the nexus requirement for taxing mail-order business,
opponents argue that with more than 6,400 different tax rates in the U.S. (Rappaport,
1994).  Simply calculating and remitting the applicable taxes to every jurisdiction from
which a customer orders could be quite burdensome, particularly for the smaller, “push-
cart” type sellers thought to populate the Internet marketspace.  Complex tax regulation
enforceable on a mature market might eliminate whole classes of small, less sophisticated
Internet sellers.Practically speaking, however, this enforcement problem is actually less important
than it has been in the past.  Calculation of taxes for each particular jurisdiction may be
tedious, but such a task is well-suited to an electronic environment.  Companies such as
Vertex or Taxware International have produced databases that can calculate the amount of
tax to be collected if given the address of the purchaser and the amount of the purchase,
data known to the merchant for transactions involving the shipment of physical goods.  In
the unlikely event that private companies price this software beyond the reach of most
smaller merchants, state governments would have incentives to invest in a low-cost or
even free system fully linked to popular electronic commerce platforms.
Some administrative aspects of remittance still remain.  They may entail pre-
registration with certain state tax authorities and a significant amount of paperwork.
Some commentators have suggested the creation of a single national clearinghouse to
streamline the ministerial aspects of tallying and remitting tax on transactions made by
small firms with customers in multiple jurisdictions (Eads et al., 1997).  Here, again, states
have a strong incentive to take up simplifying recommendations to make collection easy.
Many proposals, for example, would simplify collection by having only a single rate per
state.  Also, the BCG (1998) report suggests that online sales are actually somewhat
concentrated among a small number of sellers.  About half of all sales come from the top
ten sellers and more than three-quarters come from the top 50.  Thus applying a de
minimus rule would probably not result in much reduction in revenue.
A second set of potential enforcement difficulties concern the difficulty of
identifying individuals or even transactions in the electronic environment.  At the extreme,
if both merchant and consumer can be anonymous online (giving no indication of theirphysical location) and can transact in untraceable “e-cash,” enforcing the sales tax online
could have serious problems.
 At present, we do not believe that this difficulty is as relevant as has been
portrayed in the popular debate.  For now, online commerce is dominated by credit card
payments and credit card verification often hinges on whether one can confirm the billing
address of the account.  Given this zip code and address information, simple software
could immediately calculate the tax and send payment for most transactions involving
physical goods sold online.  Merchants with nexus already make such calculations
regularly.
There still remains the potential problem of verifying location of the buyer for
transactions involving electronic goods.  Note, however, that such transactions are not
typically subject to sales tax as they often do not have physical counterparts.  This is, then,
largely a question of whether sales taxes should apply to this new category of goods.  This
issue is no different than existing discussions about whether sales taxes should apply to
services (see McLure, 1997).  Such issues are certainly beyond the scope of this paper and
are likely beyond the scope of the ITFA advisory commission, as well.
In the future, however, non-credit card payment mechanisms such as incentive-
based scrip-like systems (e.g., “Cybergold,”) where members earn and trade “points”
redeemable through participating merchants or micropayment systems (e.g., Cybercash
and Echarge) may become increasingly important and would seem to restore the problems
of anonymous customers.  This assumes, however, that the Internet of tomorrow will be
similar in the relevant respects to the Internet of today.  It is conceivable that compliance
and enforcement may actually become easier as the architecture of the Internet evolves tobetter suit electronic commerce-perhaps even easier than they are for non-Internet-based
transactions.  Further, government policy decisions themselves will likely have a major
influence on the “code” underlying the Internet and its transparency to government policy
(see Lessig, 1998).
Network effects, for example, are likely to narrow the payment mechanisms down
to a small number of choices.  So long as there is general centralization at some key point
among Internet payment schemes, the government will have a way to collect taxes from
most transactions.  If policy makers, for example, simply attach their reporting
requirements to the most popular payment schemes, they could calculate, collect, and
remit sales tax on transactions without requiring the merchant to do much work.  An extra
charge representing a sales tax would be applied, collected, and electronically remitted as
an integral part of each instance of payment.  Apart from payment mechanisms, server-side
e-commerce software could be revised to incorporate sales tax.  Government tax rules
would give incentives to (or perhaps even require) those controlling the payment
mechanism software to ensure that their products incorporate calculation, collection, and
remittance of tax at the moment of sale.  Those wanting to evade tax collection and
remittance would have to find and use “bootleg,” nonstandard software to handle
customer payments (and do so in a way that could not be easily detected by state
governments).
More generally, the advent of digital signatures to enable trusted commerce means
that the respective states can themselves become common to a transaction, freely verifying
the residence of someone wishing to buy something.  Merchants with consumers who are
unable or unwilling to offer residence verification from any jurisdiction could be assessedsome sort of tax then allocated in a “throwback” way to the jurisdiction in which the
merchant operates, or among the known jurisdictions in which the merchant sells (see
Eads et al., 1997; Klassen and Shackelford, 1998 analyze the economic effects of
throwback rules in the retail context).
The essence of any effort on enforcement is not to spend resources in an effort to
eliminate every single instance of fraud.  This standard is unrealistic even for retail sales
taxes.  Rather, the goal is to make compliance easy and evasion difficult so that the
problem is limited.  In this sense, in the short-run there may be some problems with trying
to enforce sales taxes online but looking forward these are unlikely to present a serious
problem for standard goods in the electronic environment.
Externalities and Under-Provision
A final set of cost associated with taxing Internet commerce relate to the potential
existence of externalities.  According to the results in Goolsbee (1998), if taxes were
applied effectively to Internet purchases, there would be a significant reduction in the
amount bought online.  If there are important externalities, this reduction could be a
significant social cost.  Many of the arguments in the political arena that we should protect
or nurture the Internet at an early stage of development are in this spirit.  Here we
evaluate two potential sources of social under-provision: network benefits and information
problems.
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The first is the potential positive externality arising from network externalities-that
the benefit to each Internet user rises with the size of the overall network.  The idea is that
seeding the Internet early will yield large benefits in the future.  There is very littleempirical evidence concerning the magnitudes of network benefits associated with either
the Internet in general or Internet commerce specifically.
10  In the case of online
commerce, the potential spillovers may involve local learning spillovers (e.g., a friend
explains which websites are useful or that using credit cards online is safe), demand side
economies of scale (e.g., with a big enough potential market a merchant will be willing to
incur fixed costs to enter various niche markets or develop additional features), or direct
network benefits (e.g., if auction sites can create networks of otherwise thin markets, both
buyers and sellers benefit).  In each case, as the number of Internet customers grows, the
value of Internet commerce rises.  It is important to note, however, that for network
externalities to justify, essentially, infant industry protection of the Internet, electronic
commerce must do more than simply divert sales from retail stores as discussed above.
We first ask if there is any empirical evidence favoring the existence of spillovers
associated with Internet commerce.  Does getting a person to buy online actually lead
others to follow suit?  Existing data are largely inadequate to answer this question
precisely but for the individuals in our data, we have some qualitative information on the
topic.  In addition to reporting demographics information, people with online access also
provide information about the share of their friends and family who buy things online.
They can answer ALL (<1%), MOST (2%), SOME (17%), VERY FEW (46%), or
NONE (35%).
Since this is a single cross-section that lacks further information, we cannot deal
with the obvious potential problem of unobserved common traits among friends beyond
the observables and location dummies as, for example, Goolsbee and Klenow (1998) do in
their study of network benefits.  Nor can we show that spillovers are actually externalitiesin the spirit of (Leibowitz and Margolis, 1994).  Given that these are the only data
available, however, we attempt to examine what correlations exist in them.
We do a standard probit regression of whether an individual with online access has
bought something online.  In it, we include the same individual control variables as before
(income, age, education, race, marital status, the presence of children, the use of a
computer at work, the operation of a business from home, whether the individual already
had a computer in the year preceding the survey, and dummy variables for the
metropolitan area of residence).  In addition, we include dummy variables for the share of
friends buying online.  If there are local spillovers, having more friends and family buying
online should make the individual more likely to purchase.  As shown in table 5, people
are more likely to have bought on the Internet the greater the share of their friends that
have done so.  Moving from having no friends buying online to having most buying online,
for example, raises the probability of purchase by more than 0.40.  This is a large and
significant coefficient and is consistent with local spillovers (although also consistent with
common unobservables among friends).
At the same time, it is important to think about the size of future network
externalities.  The major network externalities are likely to exhausted or at least
diminished once the Internet achieves major scale.  Too often, arguments for infant
industry protection transform into arguments established industry protection arguments
though completely lacking in merit.  Further, we expect that eventually there will be an
important negative network externality at work (to the extent it is not already) in
increasing Internet congestion due to the prevalence of zero marginal cost pricing.
11  Thecongestion problem is likely to get worse as the Internet grows and argues against
subsidizing the growth rate through tax policies.
The second externality-type argument regards the information problems associated
with the security of Internet transactions.  In reality, credit card security on the Internet is
extremely high.  There are no direct calculations of the incidence of online fraud but
experts generally agree that it is much more likely to have one’s credit card number stolen
over the phone, for example, than online yet over-the-phone use is common (Fraza, 1998).
Further, even if one’s credit card is stolen, there is a $50 limit on the amount that the
consumer is liable for the charges.
The Forrester Technographics 98 data asked the 80% of Internet users who have
not bought online why they have not done so.  By far the most common answer,
accounting for 45% of the responses, was that they did not want to give out their credit
card information over the Internet.  When asked to give their opinions of the level of
security of credit card information given out over the web (rated from one to ten with ten
being extremely secure and one being not at all secure) the respondents’ average rating
was only a 2.9.  The overall safety and the limited risk associated with Internet purchases
does not appear to be widely understood by Internet users.   
With the apparent asymmetric information on the part of new consumers about
security, there may be justification for encouraging people to try shopping online.  In the
social sense, there may be too little Internet commerce.  Qualitatively, this is a cost of
taxing Internet commerce, though, again, this is a strictly short-run justification.  Once
Internet commerce is established as a conventional sales channel, there is no reason to give
a benefit.Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the costs and benefits associated with enforcing
taxes on Internet commerce.  The results suggest several things.  One, because of its
limited size relative to retail and because of the type of products being purchased,
aggressive enforcement of taxes on Internet commerce would raise only a small amount of
revenue over the next several years.  Two, Internet commerce does not seem to be
primarily fueled by diversion from retail sales.  Third, not enforcing taxes on the Internet
does disproportionally benefit higher income and high educated people but this effect has
lessened substantially in the last two years.  Fourth, the costs of complying with taxes on
Internet commerce are unlikely to be very large for most online transactions.  Fifth, there
is suggestive evidence of spillovers and of information problems that should be considered
costs of aggressively applying taxes.  These benefits are primarily restricted to the short
run, however.
Given that the costs of maintaining the status quo are small and the benefits of
nurturing the Internet seem to be somewhat concentrated in the short run, a natural
compromise position might be a moratorium on enforcement of Internet sales taxes in the
short-run followed by equal treatment once the conditions change.  This is not quite the
same as the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998.  The ITFA is a moratorium only on new
and discriminatory taxes and leaves the broader question of sales taxes to be resolved in
the future upon the recommendations of an Advisory commission.  Hopefully, results such
those in this paper will encourage advocates and policy makers on both sides to give more
empirical thought to the tax issues raised by the Internet.TABLE 1:
 TOTAL STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUE IN THE U.S. (in millions of $)
Type Of Revenue 1995-96 (FY)
State and Local
1995-96 (FY)
State
1995-96 (FY)
Local
Total Tax Revenue
General Sales Taxes
Property Taxes
Individual Income Taxes
Corporate Income Taxes
Selective Sales Taxes (Total)
Other Taxes and Charges (Total)
689,038
169,071
209,440
146,843
32, 009
79,922
51,753
418,390
139,363
9,973
133,548
29,315
66,751
39,440
270,602
29,709
199,467
13,296
2,693
13,123
12,313
Source: Bureau of the Census, United States State and Local Government FinancesTABLE 2A:
ESTIMATED ONLINE CONSUMER SALES BY SECTOR
(FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1998)
Sector Amount  (in millions of $)
Computer Goods
Financial Services
Auctions
Travel
Books and Entertainment
Gifts
Consumer Goods
Apparel
Food and Wine
Automotive
Home and Garden
Total
1,510
1,429
898
848
366
138
138
92
67
28
27
5,541
Source: Boston Consulting Group (1998).TABLE 2B: ONLINE REVENUE BY CATEGORY IN 1998 AND 2003 ($million)
Category Estimate: 1998 Forecast: 2003
Total U.S. Revenue
Software
Books
Music
Videos
Event Tickets
Apparel
Flowers
Greetings
Specialty Gifts
Toys
Sporting Goods
Tools and Garden
Travel
Computer Hardware
Consumer Electronics
Appliances
Household Goods
Food & Beverage
Health and Beauty
Misc.
7,826
665
630
187
151
115
530
212
36
63
68
56
63
3,073
1,090
84
17
83
235
213
255
108,031
3,179
3,002
2,495
1,346
2,572
13,510
11,699
320
544
1,481
1,918
1,021
29,447
14,965
6,132
2,275
3,446
10,836
6,294
2,342
Source: Forrester Research, inc.TABLE 3:
IMPACT OF ONLINE BUYING ON RETAIL SHOPPING FREQUENCY
(1) (2) (3)
Bought Online
Other Controls
Dummies
Estimation
n
R2
.153
(.034)
11 variables
None
Ordered logit
24,412
--
.183
(.029)
11 variables
None
Ordered logit
22,465
--
.248
(.039)
11 variables
Metro-State
OLS
22,465
.08
Notes: The dependent variable in (1) is the maximum amount of shopping reported in the
five categories as described in the text.  The dependent variable in (2) and (3) is the
summation of the five categories, also as described in the text.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The included control variables are not listed for space.  They are the same
variables as those in table 5.  The estimation method is listed at the bottom of the column.TABLE 4:
INCOME AND EDUCATION OF INTERNET USERS
Internet Access
No Internet Access
Internet 3+ years
Internet 2-3 years
Internet 1-2 Years
Internet <1 year
Income
57.2
35.6
61.4
61.4
58.4
52.2
Education
14.9
13.0
15.6
15.2
14.8
14.3
Income < 25,000
Income 25-50,000
Income >50,000
Share Online
.11
.22
.41
Share of Online Users Having
Bought Online
.17
.21
.23
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Forrester Research, Inc.TABLE 5:
INFLUENCE OF FRIENDS ON THE PROBABILITY OF BUYING ONLINE
Variable (1)
ALL FRIENDS BUY ONLINE
MOST FRIENDS BUY ONLINE
SOME FRIENDS BUY ONLINE
VERY FEW FRIENDS BUY ONLINE
INCOME
EDUCATION
AGE
FEMALE
SINGLE
CHILDREN UNDER 18
ASIAN
NON-WHITE MINORITY
USE A COMPUTER AT WORK
RUN A BUSINESS FROM HOME
OWNED A COMPUTER IN 1996
Dummies
N
R2
.470 (.049)
.408 (.021)
.333 (.007)
.147 (.006)
.003 (.001)
.005 (.001)
-.002 (.001)
.061 (.005)
.025 (.006)
-.041 (.006)
-.011 (.018)
-.009 (.007)
.005 (.006)
.044 (.007)
.110 (.007)
Metropolitan Area
24059
.14
Notes: The dependent variable is a variable equal to one if the respondent reports having
bought something online in the past three months.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
The equation is estimated using a Probit.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Forrester Research is a leading market research company whose specialty is the
information economy.  In their Technographics 98 program they conducted a major
consumer survey about technology in which they asked more than 110,000 people about
their characteristics and their ownership of technology (the field work was done by the
NPD Group).  More description of the survey can be found in Goolsbee (1998).
The individual variables we use are income, education, age, gender, marital status,
race, children under 18, ownership of a computer in 1996, use of a computer at work, and
running of a business from home.  We turned the series of dummy variables for education,
age, and income into continuous variables.  If income was stated as between 35 and 40
thousand dollars, for example, we imputed an income of 37.5 thousand.  For top-coded
variables, we tried various values but changing them had almost no impact on the results.
Similarly, just including the variables as dummies gave the same results, as well.
Though the sampling methodology is proprietary, it is meant to make the survey
nationally representative and is both widely respected and very expensive for private
sector companies.  It also matches up somewhat well with government sources such as the
Current Population Survey on obvious variables like income, gender, and so on.
The survey also presents data about whether individuals owned a computer, when
they got their computer, what type of computer, whether they had access to the Internet,
and many other questions of this nature.  For those who reported having online access,
they were also asked how long they had been online, whether they had bought something
online, what share of their friends and family are online, and what share of their friends
and family have bought something online.  These are variables we use in our analysis.ENDNOTES
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1 Examples of the existing literature include Fox and Murray (1997), Hellerstein (1997a;
1997b; 1997c), Horner and Owen (1996), McLure (1997; 1998; forthcoming), Murray
(1997), and Steele and Hellerstein (1994).
2 One exception is Goolsbee (1998) who empirically examines the question of how current
sales tax rates influence the likelihood of consumers to buy over the Internet.
3 In this calculation we ignore the fact that in some states food and clothing are exempt
from sales tax.  This would make the number even larger.
4 This estimate is calculated as follows: At the end of 1998/start of 1999, Dell announced
online sales at a rate of $14 million per day or $1.25 billion per quarter (Dell, 1999).
Since this is after a substantial growth rate over the course of the year we assume that
Dell’s revenue over the year grew at the 213 percent annual rate (33 percent per quarter)
estimated in the BCG (1998) report for total commerce that Dell’s online sales were
divided the same way as their total sales (according to Dell, 1998, this was about 65% to
government, big business, and educational users).  With total sales of $1.25 billion in the
last quarter of 1998, this would imply sales of $531 million and $707 million in the first
two quarters of the year and if 35% of these sales were to individuals, this would total
$435 million for the period.
5 This assumes one half of computer software and computer hardware currently do not
pay sales taxes but would under a rule change.  It also assumes that flowers and food
satisfy the nexus requirements and thus do not result in revenue losses when purchased
online.  Event tickets and online greetings are assumed to be untaxed.
6 Repeating the analysis in the interim years yielded a revenue loss of $470 million in 1999,
$880 million in 2000, $1.4 billion in 2001, and $2.3 billion in 2002.  The last number is 15
to 20 times smaller than the estimates quoted by advocates in the popular press for the
same year.
7 This is assuming no behavioral responses on the part of retail sales of raising the sales tax
by very small amounts.
8 Note that optimal tax theory does not necessarily call for the rates to be equal on the two
types of commerce.  While the well-known results of Cortlett and Hague (1954) suggest
that we should tax similar goods similarly, if the price elasticities of Internet customers and
retail customers are very different it may actually be efficient to allow those with high
elasticities to have lower rates.  This is the finding of Sandmo (1981) in a different
context.  In some sense, the least distortive tax would be the one with high rates on those
people who would not change their behavior.  Given the high implied price elasticities of                                                                                                                                           
electronic commerce found in Goolsbee (1998), the Sandmo result might suggest that,
fairness considerations aside, rates should be lower for Internet commerce.
9 There is a third potential externality relating to retail market power but we do not
consider it in detail here.  If local retailers have market power, Trandel (1992) shows that
having a tax-free outside option can reduce this market power and actually improve
consumer welfare.  Given that we have no data on market power, we will just assume that
markets are competitive.
10 Goolsbee and Klenow (1998) show that there seem to be significant local spillovers
from using the Internet and using e-mail.
11 Some important early discussions of congestion can be found in Mackie-Mason and
Varian (1995; 1996), Bohm et al. (1994), and Gupta et al. (1995).